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IN THE
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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action to quiet title to a driveway 10 feet
wide and 99 feet deep across the prop·erty of appellants
at 418 East Fourth 'South, Salt Lake City, Utah, claimed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
by the respondents, their neighbors to the west, residing
at 414 East Fourth South. Respondents filed a counterclaim asserting right to the driveway. The complaint
was resolved against the appellants and the counterclaim
in favor of the respondents by the Honorable Clarence
E. Baker, Judge of the Third District Court.
The cornplaint alleged that appellants own land
with 3 rods frontage and 10 rods depth, which land was
particularly described but which is the property at 418
East Fourth South. The complaint alleged that defendants claim a right of way over the west 10 feet of the
north 99 feet of that property in connection with their
adjoining land.
In the answer the respondents admit ownership of
the plaintiff, admit claiming the right of way and deny
that it is without right and then by way of counterclaim
allege that respondents are the owners of the lot immediately west of the land of appellants. Respondents allege
that they are the owners "of a right of way across the
premises of the plaintiff for the purpose of passing
over the same with or without horses, wagons, automobiles, trucks and other vehicles, and in any and all
other reasonable manner and for ingress to and egress
from the p,remise.s of the .defendant above described,
which said easement and right of way has been used
by the defendants and their predecessors in interest
openly, adversely, continuously and uninterruptedly for
a period of more than 35 \years last past, and the same
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is appurtenant to the said above described prPinises
O\vned by the defendants as aforesaid," (R. 3-4). The
counterclaiu1 then alleges that the appellants threaten
to obstruct the easement and right of way of the defendants and that the claim is wrongful. The respondents
pray for adjudication of their easen1ent and right of
way as n1entioned and that the land of the appellants
be held subservient to the said easement and that appellants be enjoined fro1n interfering with the right of
\Yay, (R. 4-5).
At the opening of the case the question was raised
whether the claim of respondents was by deed or p-rescription. Respondents stated that the claim was by
prescription only, (R. 9-10).
Witness Dilworth Strasser testified for the appellants and offered in evidenc_e Exhibits A, B, and C.
Exhibit A, an abstract of title, shows the property in
appellants, Fred E. Weidner and Bessie Evelyn F'erguson. Exhibit B is the deed from those owners to Ada
C. Pace, dated October 8, 1950; and Exhibit C, a deed
to the appellant Strasser. The witness testified that he
was buying the property from Rachel P. Lunt and upon
this showing the appellants rested.
In opening their case, respondents offered in evidence Exhibit 1 which is an abstract consisting of 34
pages. Appellants objected only to Page 30, a quit claim
deed of the right of way, which page was received tentatively (R. 13). Page 24 of Exhibit 1 is a warranty
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

deed to Willie Ann Kitchens, a widow and the mother
of all of the respondents, dated in 1920, of the property
at 414 East Fourth South which deed includes a right
of way described as follows:
"Together with a right of way for foot passengers over the following tract:
Beginning 84' 2" East from the Northwest
corner of said Lot 5, and running thence South
68'; thence West 1' 4"; thence North 68'; thence
East 1' 4", to beginning.
Together with a right of way over the following:
Beginning at a point 84' 2" East from· the
Northwest corner of said Lot 5, and running
thence South 68'; thence East 1' 4"; North 68';
thence West 1' 4", to the place ·of beginning for
foot passengers."
Exhibit 1 shows on Page 31 the warranty deed from
Willie Ann Kitchens to her five children. Willie Dee
Kitchens and Homer Nelson Kitchens subsequently conveyed their interests to the respondent, George W.
Kitchens, as shown at Pages 33 and 34. The abstract
also includes a quit claim deed dated May 15, 1936, and
recorded May 18, 1936, from Carrie E. Weidner to Willie
Ann Kitchens describing the right of way in dispute.
The pictures, Exhibits 3, E, and G, are taken of the
properties involved and show the property of appellants
as the house on the left, and the property of respond-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
ents as th~ house on the right, and drive way running
south fron1 Fourth South Street bet"Teen the two houses.
Exhibit 2 is taken from near the southea8t corner of the
house belonging to respondents and shows the woodshed
on the left of the house and son1e distance south of the
propert~~ and that there is an open space between the
house and the 'voodshed. This is likewise shown by
Exhibit F 'Yhich is looking north from the woodshed
on the property of respondents and shows the house of
respondents.
The respondent, George W. Kitchens, testified he is
a Ya owner of the property at 414 East F'Ourth South,
and that the other respondents are also part owners, (R.
14). He testified that he has been acquainted with the
property since 1920 when it was purchased by his
mother, Mrs. Willie Ann Kitchens, (R. 15). When he
first drove to the property in 1920 he parked his car
on the property of appellants part way down the right
of way, (R. 18). Afterward he and his brother frequently drove down the right of way in going to their
mother's home, and the coal company used the driveway
for delivering coal and wood as there was no other
way to deliver to the woodshed, (R. 22). Pedestrians
walked down the driveway to the rear of the property
of respondents, (R. 22), and in those days there was a
fence on the east side of their property about 3 feet
east of the houseline which fence ran south to the coal
shed through which there was a gate just at the coal
house, (R. 22-23). This gate was 4¥2 feet wide and for
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pedestrians only, (R. 23). There was and is a window
on the east side of the coal shed through which coal was
thrown when coal was delivered; (R. 24). Exhibit 2
shows the property as in 1920, (R. 24). The driveway
was used by the mother of respondents and the family
for parking cars, for the delivery of wood and groceries,
for every purpose that served the house from 1920 down
to the present time, (R. 27). Mrs. Carrie E. Weidner
was the next-door neighbor, (R. 27). She and her husband resided there and owned the property when the
Kitchenses first moved into their property. The two
families visited back and forth, outside and inside the
houses, back yard and in the front yard more or less
constantly, (R. 28), and on a half-dozen occasions George
Kitchens was with the Weidners when deliveries were
made into the Kitchens property and neither Mr. nor
Mrs. Weidner ever objected to- use of the driveway and
there was never any objection made to the use of the
driveway until 1946 when some people who rented the
property of appellants built a gate between the two
houses and across the driveway, (R. 29). This gate was
remove·d by respondent George W. Kitchens and the
driveway has been used ever since ·without objection,
there having been no interruption from 1920 until the
gate was placed in 1946, (R. 29-30). The_ fence extending
along the east boundary of respondent's property as far
south as the coal shed was in place until up to the year
1946 when he tore-it down, (R.c 31). The driveway was
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repaired and kept up by the family of respondents by
placing ashes on it, filling n1ud holes and water holes
and sn1oothing it down, but it \vas used more by the
Kitchenses than by the \v"""eidners, (R. 31). He never
sa".,. the ,,. . eidners repair the drive,vay, (R. 32).

On cross examination ~Ir. Kitchens testified that he
did not inspect the property at 41-± East Fourth South
prior to its purchase by his n1other and that when he
first saw it about 30 days later there 'vas a fence from
the southeast corner of the house to the coal shed, ( R.
33), with a door on the north of the coal shed and a kind
of window on the east side, and that the coal shed was
no longer used for storing coal for heating but only for
the coal stove in the kitchen (R. 34). There was a gate
in the fence right next to the coal shed, (R. 34). There
was and is a sidewalk to the west of the house of respondents that goes along the west side of the house and turns
east at the back to the back door. The shortest route
from the sidewalk to the back door was along this sidewalk and into the back door, since to reach the back
door across the back way required a pedestrian to go to
the south end of the fence and through the gate and then
back across the yard to reach the back door, (R. 35).
There is also a woodshed on the prop,erty of respondents located west of the coal shed and being of approximately the same size, (R. 35). The woodshed could not
be reached from the driveway and to unload materials
from a wagon it could be carried through the gate at
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the back or from. the front along the west ·walk and into
the wood shed, (R. 35.:.36). The witness never saw coal
or wood delive·red into the back by bringing it in bags
or bundles along the sidewalk west of the house, (R. 36).
He remembered no gate placed across the driveway prior
to 1946 and no gate in 1932. He tore down the- fence on
his own property and the gate placed across the driveway by the tenant at separate times which might have
been two or three days apart in 1946, (R. 37-38). The
gate was across the driveway two or three days. Mr.
Evans put it up one day and Kitchens took it down the
next, (R. 39). He denied ever having an argument with
one of the tenants concerning the parking of cars in the
back of the property of appellant, (R. 39).
George W. Kitchens further testified that he owns
two houses on F·ourth 'South west of the property of
respondents and two houses on Fourth East going south
from Fourth South and that he plans to operate the
entire group· of houses as a motel and that there is no
means of getting an automobile off the streets except
through the driveway between the properties of respondents and appellants, (R. 40).

"Q. Is it your intention, if you are successful in
establishing a right-of-way between 414 and
418 to park cars in back of 414 for the benefit
of all the Motel~
A. For any use necessary.
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Q. In eonnertion \Yith that ~Iotel '~
. ...\... ~-lnything that is neeessary.
Q. ,,. .elL by that you n1ean, necessary 1n connection 'vith any of those properties J?
. .\.. If anything is neeessary, I would use it like
I al"~ays haYe.
Q. Your contention is you have absolute rightof-\Yay for any purpose you desire to put the
property to?
~\.. Yes.
Q. Including the building of garages on your
property)?
~-\... Yes.
Q. And using this driveway as a means of access~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. What do you base that claim on~
A. I own the land on both sides of it, and certainly if I have used that right-of-way for
forty years, I can do what I please on my own
side of the property." (R. 40-41).
When his mother purchased the property in 1920,
the driveway was in use, it gave the appearance of
vehicles having been driven down it and people having
walked down it. No new driveway was made and they
simply added some use to an existing driveway which
had. been there for a long time, (R. 42). The Kitchens
family put ashes in the driveway more or less all the
time and no one ever complained about it, (R. 43). The
use of the driveway by the Kitchens family didn't make
the driveway wider, longer, or deeper; it didn't require
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the moving of any buildings, trees, or shrubs and they
used the driveway just as they found it, (R. 44).
George W. Kitchens is buying the other two-thirds
( 2;3) interest in the property from his brother and sister,
the other respondents, and has the entire property under ·
contract, (R. 45). He is a shoe salesman at Z.C.M.I (R.
45-46). He also owns a motel at 3007 S·outh State Street,
besides the 1notel on Fourth South and Fourth East,
(R. 46).
Mrs. Minnie Kitchens Packard testified that she is
one of the defendants. She was living with her mother
when the property at 414 East Fourth South was purchased by her mother. She went with her several times
to look at the property, (R. 47). There was a driveway
at that time between the two properties, its use was
ap·parently well established, this was spring of the year
and the driveway was muddy, (R. 48). There was a
fence on the east side of her mother's property which
began at the north side of the house about three feet
east of it and extended back to the little gate next to
the coal house, (R. 49). She lived with her mother at
that time for about two years. The driveway was used
for coal, wood, and as a driveway for them and their
friends, (R. 49). The use of the driveway was not interrupted until the fence was put up in 1946. There was a
very friendly relationship between the two families and
they parked their cars on the Weidner property with
the Weidn~rs' permission, (R. 50). The Weidners made
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no objection ""'hen th~ l(itehens ears used the drive,vay
in their presence, (R. 50).
:Jirs. Packard further testified that the l(itchens
frunily neYer had exclusiYe use of the driveway (R. 51),
and that the usual 'Yay into the Kitchens ho1ne in connection "~ith a. ear "~as through the driveway between the
two houses and that so1neone in her family has had a
car all the time during the past thirty years. She has·
had one herself since 1923, (R. 51). The Kitchens family
used to put ashes in the driYe,Yay to cover up the mud
holes during the winter and rainy weather, (R. 52).
She took the pictures 'vhich are Exhibits .2 and 3 in
19-!7, (R,. 52). Xeither ~Ir. nor Mrs. Weidner ever told
~Irs. Kitchens in the presence of Mrs. Packard that the
Kitchens family should not use the driveway or that they
had no right to use the drive\vay and never until that
gate was put across the driveway did anyone·ever question the Kitchenses' right to use the driveway, (R. 54).
On cross examination Mrs. Packard testified that the
pictures that she took could have been taken in 1949 and
she knows that they were taken after her mother's death
which was in 1946, (R. 55-56). She lived in the Kitchens
property about eight months out of each year until1946,
(R. 58). It was the practice of her mother to call Mrs.
Weidner to the telephone which she did very frequently,
and her mother and Mrs. Weidner were very friendly
and visited back and forth all of the time using the little
gateway by the coal shed, (R. 59). There was no agreement between l\1rs. Kitchens and Mrs. Weidner that the
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Kitchenses could use the driveway in exchange for the
W eidners' use of the Kitchenses' telephone, (R. 59). The
gate by the coal shed was in the fence before the Kitchenses moved on the property and Mr. Weidner repaired the
gate once after the Kitchenses moved in when the gate
was falling off its hinges, (R. 60). There was never a
gate across the driveway except the one in controversy
which was put up in the year 1946.
The defendants hereupon rested their case on the
counterclaim and a!ppellants moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that no prescriptive right had
been shown. The testimony showed an uninterrupted
use for the necessary prescriptive period but no adverse
use and the testimony shows that the use made was with
permission, and that Mr. Weidner repaired the ·gate.
There never was any obj.ection made untill946, (R. 65).
This motion was denied by the Court, (R. 65).
In behalf of appellants Rachel Petty Lunt, one of the
plaintiffs, testified that in the months of October and
November, 1946, there was a fence betw.een the Kitchens
property and the disputed driveway which fence ran
clear back to the barn or coal shed, (R. 68). That fence
was taken down during the year 1947 or .1948, (R. 69).
She and Mr. Howell, attorney for the Kitchense.s, went
to the property together and inspected the driveway
fence. When she purchased the property she had an
attorney examine the abstract which pointed that there
was a deed concerning a right of way on record, but that
in his opinion the deed was of no value, (R. 71).
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Clarence J an1es EYnns testified in behalf of appellants that he lived in the property at 418 East Fourth
South for seven years fro1n 1D-11 to late 1946 or 1947,
(R. 7-1-7 5). ,,~hile he lived there the occupants at 414
East Fourth ·south "~ere ~Irs. Tanner and ~Irs. l(itchen:--~,
'vho \Yas the n1other of ~frs. Tanner, and an elderly
woman. ~Irs. Tanner pnssed a"~ay \Yhile he lived in the
home, (R. 75). He has seen 1\Irs. Packard but ·is not
acquainted with her although he believes he has seen her
visit there, (R. 75-76). George Kitchens visited the
Kitchens home whjle Evans was living in 418. He didn't
visit ver~~ often and ~Irs. Packard didn't visit very often,
(R. 76). When ~Irs. Packard would visit she wouid
drive her automobile in and ask Mr. Evans if she could
park in the driveway and he gave her permission to do
so, (R. 76). ~Ir. Kitchens also occasionally drove in
the driveway to the gate and Evans never made any
objection as it wasn't hurting them, (R. 77). He left a
car or two in the back of the property where Mr. Evans
lived and he and Mr. Kitchens had a little argument
abqut it and Evans told Kitchens to put the car out or
he would call the cops ; whereupon Mr. Kitchens moved
the cars out and never again parked in the driveway
north of the south line of the woodshed, (R. 77). While
he lived there Mr. Weidner put a fence up in April or
May of 1946, and it stayed there quite a while, maybe
three months. He believes it was George Kitchens and
his son who took the fence down while Evans was on
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a fishing trip (R.~78-79). When Evans moved away from
the property, the fence running from the Kitchens house
to the coal shed was still up, (R. 79).
On cross examination Mr. Evans t~stified that he
gave Mrs. Packard permission to leave her car in the
driveway and never objected when a coal truck used the
driveway, (R. 81-82).
Mr. Fred E. Weidner testified in behalf of appellants that he was a son of Carrie E. Weidner who owned
the property at 418 East Fourth South, and that he
acquired an interest in the property pursuant to warranty deed shown at page 16 of Exhibit A, (R. 83).
When he executed the deed, which is Exhibit B, conveying the property to Mrs. Pace, he didn't know that the
owners of the property at 414 East Fourth S.outh claimed
a right of way, (R. 84). He visited the property frequently from 1920 to 1946 and lived in the property
for three months in 1932, just after the death of his
father. There was very little use of the driveway but
there was one load of coal delivered down the driveway.
lie used the driveway himself and his use was never
interfered with. He made no objection to the carrying
of a load of coal down the driveway, (R. 85). While he
lived there in 1932 there· was a gate across the driveway
about three feet south of the house. The gate had a little
catch ·on it and was standing when he moved away in
April, 1932, (R. 86). He once called Mrs. Kitchens on
the phone and asked if she would call his mother to the
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phone ns he hated to bother her. ~rrs. Kitchens said,
"Oh, don't think about that, you let us use your driveway
and that is in payment of the telephone calls." This
conversation 'Yas prior to the death of Mrs. Weidner
in 1939, (R. 86). He had the gate put up in April of
1946 but doesn't kno"'" exactly where it was placed or how
long it stood, (R. S7). For two years after Mrs. Kitchens
moved in -!1-! East Fourth South she had coal and wood
carried in from the street and after that they were
permitted to use the driveway and so far as he knows
no objection was made to that, (R. 87). The gate in
the Kitchens fence just north of the coal shed was put
in by Mr. Weidner's father two or three years after
the Kitchenses moved in, (R. 88).
On cross examination Mr. Fred E. Weidner testified
that during the months he lived in the property in 1932
he talked to his mother about the use of the driveway,
and was told that she had an understanding with Mrs.
Kitchens that she could use Mrs. Kitchens' phone and
that Mrs. Kitchens would call her to the phone for the
use of the right of way, (R. 89). When he drove his
car into the driveway he sometimes parked in front and
sometunes in the driveway and sometimes in back of
the Weidner property, (R. 91). The gate was across
the driveway until after his father die·d and when anyone
wanted to get a delivery in they drove in the driveway,
opened the gate, and drove down the driveway, (R. 92).
His mother deeded the property to him and his sister
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in 1934 shortly after the probating of his father's estate,
(R. 92-93). There was no consideration except moral
consideration for this deed, (R. 93-94).
Mrs. Rose Weidner, the wife of Fred E. Weidner,
testified that she was well acquainted with the property
on Fourth South and lived there for three months following Mr. Weidner's death, (R. 94-95). She saw people
use the driveway in connection with the Kitchens family
and at one time a plumber came in and removed the
gate and stayed there until she had to ask him to move
for some reason and he backed his wagon out, but there
was no objection to the use of the driveway, (R. 95).
Mr. Weidner never had the driveway without a gate
across it. He was very particular about his back yard,
( R. 95). She remembered the gate being there the
morning Mr. Weidner died and she could hear Mrs.
Weidner sobbing in the kitchen and she couldn't unlock
the lock on the gate. She remembers it well after he
died and when they had renters in there the gate was
across so the babies couldn't go out into the street.
There were never any disputes with the Kitchenses
about the gate that she remembers (R. 95-96).
Mrs. Bessie Evelyn F'erguson testified on behalf of
appellants that she is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs.
William Weidner and lived in the property at 418 East
Fourth South off and on but in either 1929 or 1930
lived there for six months until she and her husband
could get in their own home, (R. 96-97). She visited
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often 'vith her n1other on Fourth South and very seldom
saw ~Ir. George l(itchens there. During the six Inonth8
she lived there :\Irs. Ki tr hen~ and her n1other didri 't
·visit very often. Once in a \Yhile they made use of the
drive,vay and ~Irs. Kitchens had some coal brought in
once \Yhich she re1nembers as her mother asked her if she
would please open the gate so the coal could get in and
she did open the gate, (R,. 98). When ~finnie Kitchens"
went a\vay she asked Mrs. eidner if she could park her
car while she loaded it and let it stay all night and her
mother said it would be all right, (R. 98). She never
sa\Y pedestrians use the driveway to get to the Kitchens
home as the)~ would drive up to the front door or· else
use the sidewalk 'vest of the home, (R. 98-99). There
have been many gates across the driveway, each of which
would stay for a long time until somebody would knock
it down then it would be put up again, and she thinks
that there have been about five gates that she remembers,
(R. 99). Her father put the gate in the fence between
the driveway and Kitchens property so Minnie and Mrs.
Kitchens could run back and forth to the Weidner home
and it was put in after Mrs. Kitchens moved in, (R. 99).

''T

On cross examination Mrs. Ferguson testified that
the Kitchenses got their coal in by using the driveway
and that they would continually break the fence and
Mr. Weidner would fix it up, (R. 100).
Mr. C. B. Petty testified on behalf of appellants that
the day before trial he took pictures which are Exhibits
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E, F·, and G, and took some of them from across the
street and one at the back showing the old coal bin, (R.
102). Whereupon the appellants rested.
Robert B. Schick testified on behalf of the respondents that he has lived in Salt Lake about ten years off
and on and he is the son of Mrs. Packard, was born at
414 East Fourth South in 1922 and lived there about
eight of the ten years he has lived in 'Salt Lake, (R. 103).
He lived at 414 several times after he had moved away
and stayed there with his grandmother. He doesn't
recall there being a gate across the driveway, the driveway itself being bounded by buildings on the two pieces
of property, (R. 104).
On cross examination Mr. Schick testified that he
was about five years old when he moved away from
the Kitchens home on Fourth South (R.105).
Mrs. Minnie Kitchens Packard was recalled by respondent and testified that Exhibit 4 was in her mother's
handwriting and that she first saw it among her mother's
effects in the safety deposit box after her death. Signature is that of Mrs. Weidner, (R.106).
Exhibit 4 is dated July 8, 1935, and recites that it is
the last wishes of Carrie E. Weidner and after referring
to a number of pieces of furniture and personal things
states, "I also want 1frs. W. A. Kitchens to have a ten
foot by 99 foot driv·ewa.y on West side of my lot." Both
parties rested.
Appellants objected to the ,proposed findings of fact
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and conclusions of la"" and derrep on the grounds generally that tl1ey 'Yere against the evidence and that
respondent had not sho,vn a prescriptive right and 111ore
specifically objected to finding No. ± for the reason that
there "~as a fence bet""een the property of the plaintiffs
until 1946 or 1949 and there 'Yas no testimony that any
vehicle ""as ever driYen from the right of way onto the
I~itrhens property until after the removal of the fence;
and further that the right of way, if granted, should
be limited to the use that 'vas made by the Kitchens
family and that it should either be limited to loading
or unloading of passengers or goods or should be limited
to uses in connection with the property at 414 East
Fourth South for pedestrian purposes, for delivery of
goods and for parking on the right of way with the
permission of the appellants; or that it should be limited
so that the use of the right of way cannot be connected
with the use or occupancy of any property other than
the property at 414 East Fourth South, (R. 113-114).
Appellants filed a motion for new trial urging insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, and that
the decision is contrary to law and also on the basis
of newly discovered evidence contained in the attached
affidavit of Eloise Bowden, (R. 117). Said affidavit
recites that she is a daughter of Bessie Weidner F-erguson and a granddaughter of the Mr. and Mrs. Weidner
who owned and lived at 418 East Fourth South for many
years and that she lived with her grandparents in oneSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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half of the house at 418 East Fourth South from April,
1937, to the fall of 1939 and was well acquainted with
Mrs. Kitchens and with the use of the driveway made by
Mrs. Kitchens and her family, and that. in or about June,
1937, Mrs. Kitchens called at the home of Mrs. Weidner
and asked Mrs. Bowden to go with her into the grandmother and said to her, "I am giving your grandmother
this dollar in front of you, Eloise, so that if anything ever
comes up concerning the driveway you can say that I
have paid for the use of it," and on another occasion
just before Christmas, 1939, Mrs. Kitchens gave Mrs.
Bowden $1.00 and asked her to give it to her grandmother
in the hospital in payment of their agreement that $1.00
a year be paid for the use of the right of way so that it
wouldn't be for nothing, (R. 117). On April16, 1937, she
and her husband had a telephone put in their home at 418
East Fourth South and thereafter Mrs. Weidner used
their telephone and on several occasions thereafter Mrs.
Kitchens brought over bread "to pay for the driveway"
as Mrs. Kitchens stated. From the period April, 1937,
to the time Mrs. Bowden moved in 1939 the driveway
was used by Mrs. Kitchens and her family for delivery of
coal only except when Mrs. Kitchens' grandson was home
on furlough and asked permission to park his car on the
Weidner property, which permission was given, (R. 118).
In the surn·mer of 1924 Mrs. Bowden lived with her grandparents, and during that summer the driveway was used
only for making deliveries of coal. In 1933 after Mr.
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Weidner had died,

~Irs.

''Teidner rented part of the ho1ne

to a frunily \Yhich had n little girl and to keep her in a
gate \Yas put across the driYe\\Tay \Yhich had a little gate
in it so people could \Yalk through on the sidewalk and
this gate re1nained across the drive,vay for three to six
months, (R. 118). The trial court denied the motion for
new trial, (R. 119).
ST.A.TE~IENT

1.

OF POINTS RELIED ON

The court erred in finding any prescriptive

easement in favor of respondents.
(.A.).

The applicable presumptions favor appellants.

(B)

The motion to dismiss the counterclaim should

have been granted.
(C)

If appellants' evidence be believed, there was

no acqUiescence by predecessors of appellants.
2.

The court erred in making a right of way avail-

able to respondents for use which would benefit other
lands than the property known as 414 East Fourth South.
3.

The court erred in permitting respondents to

drive. across the right of way onto their land where a
fence had existed until at least 1946.
4.

The court erred in denying the motion for new

trial.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERR.ED IN FINDING ANY PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS.

It fairly appears from the evidence of respondents
that the right of way was used by the Kitchens family
openly and continuously for twenty years, but there is no
evidence that this use was adverse or under claim of
right. Respondents' testimony was that the families were
very friendly and that in the presence of the Weidners
the driveway was used without objection from the Weidners. The W eidners used the driveway all the time and
the use by respondents was not burdensome and did not ·
alter or extend the driveway in any way. The use was
not adverse or under a claim that the W eidners could not
have interfered or stopped the use that was being made.
The real question to be decided, is, therefore, the following: "where an existing right of way is used by a purchaser of property for twenty years in a manner which
does not interfere with its use by the owner of the land
and does not extend the right of way in any way is a prescriptive easement acquired~"
(A).

THE APPLICABLE PRESUMPTIONS FAVOR AP-

PELLANTS.

In Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070, the
plaintiff was the owner of a small farm across which ran
a roadway used by him and his. predecessors in interest.
The defendant claimed an easement over the roadway
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and established use by hin1 and his predecessors in in-_
terest for Inore than 20 years. The court held that the
defendants had the burden of establishing their prescri ptive right ~~by clear and satisfactory evidence" and then
said:
~'A

20 year use alone of a 'vay is not sufficient
to establish an easement. ~1ere use of a roadway
opened for his o"~ purpose will be presu1ned permissive. An antagonistic or adverse use of a way
cannot spring from a permissive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. It cannot be
adverse when it rests upon a license or mere neighborly accommodation. Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive user."

The oldest Utah case dealing with claim to prescriptive right in a roadway used by the owner of the premises
is Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 at 293
where the court said :
"Where a person opens a way for the use of
his own premises, and other persons use it also
without causing damage, the presumption is, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that such use
by the latter was permissive, and not under a clain1
of right."
This court reaffirmed this rule in Sdrales v. Rondos,
(Utah) 209 P. 2d 562 at 565.
The Sdrales case arose in Salt Lake City and involved the claim of an owner next to a corner property
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to have an easement across a road way used also by the
owner of the corner property. After discussing the rule
of the Harkness v. Woodmansee case the court said:
"The facts of the instant case bring it within
the rule laid down in Harkness v. Woodmansee
since the defendant does not contend that the
plaintiffs and their predecessors in title did not
use the alleyway for their own purposes. Indeed,
the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiffs and
their predecessors made use of the alleyway in
receiving deliveries to their buildings and in gaining access to the tin garage at the east end of the
alleyway.
"There is no evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the facts of the instant case that
the use of the alleyway by the defendant and his
predecessors in title was permissive and not under
claim of right."
Cache Valley Banking Compan;y v. Cache Cownty
Poultry Growers Assoc., ______ (Utah) ______ , 209 P. 2d 251
at 255 and 256, is a strong case for the position of the
appellants here. In that case the District court found
that the claimant had used the disputed right of way as
a means of ingress and egress to and from its property
for more than 20 years and further found that there
was no evidence of any communication either oral or
· written between the respective owners of the two properties with respect to use. "No permission for the use
thereof has been expressly sought and no right thereto
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expressly clai1ned and none has been expressly given or
denied." lTpon this showing the court found that the
use of the right of 'Yay 'Yas open, continuous and uninterrupted and 'Yith a claim of adverse right and was not
permissive and therefore gaye judg1nent for the claimant and enjoined the plaintiff from interfering with that
right. Upon appeal the Supreme Court stated the problem before it as follows :
"If the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
finding that the usage was adverse and with the
claim of right on the part of the claimant and its
predecessors and was not by permission . of the
owner then the judgment must be affirmed otherwise it must be· reversed."
The Supreme Court then adverted to the rule in the
Harkness v. Woodmansee case, and reaffirmed it, referring also to Jensen v. Gerrard and referred then to Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, 170 A.L.R.
770 in which the correctness of the doctrine in the Harkness case was reaffirmed although the court had held that
the facts of the Zollinger case were different and did not
call for application of the presumption that a use is
permissive. The Supreme Court then st3:ted and held:

"* * * The presumption stated in that rule
is that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the trier of fact is required to find that the use was
with the permission of the owner and not under
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a claim of right. Here all of the elements required
to establish that presumption are present. The
railroad company opened up this way on its own
premises, for its own use in operating its freight
yards, the additional use thereof by the defendants
and its predecessors did not interfere with that
use or damage the owner, and there is not a word
of evidence contrary to the premise that this usage
was with the permission of the railroad company
and not against it under a claim of right -or adverse. So under that rule defendant cannot succeed."
Actually, this case is stronger for appellants than
the Cache Valley Banking Company case because there
the evidence shows no permission and no discussion of use
between the parties whereas in the case at bar Mrs.
Packard and Mr. Kitchens both testified that their use
of the property was known to Mr. and Mrs. Weidner,
(R. 29, 50), that Mr. and. l\1:rs. Weidner saw them using
it, (R. 29, 50), and testified that on occasion specific permission was given to put cars in the driveway and to use
the driveway, (R. 50). A daughter of the Weidners on
one occasion opened the gate so that a delivery could be
made, (R. 98), and on another occasion Mr. Weidner repaired the gate by which the Kitchenses passed from
the right of way onto their own property at the rear of
the house, (R. 60), and Mrs. Packard asked permission
of the tenant Mr. Evans before she parked her car in the
driveway, (R. 76).
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Citations from other jurisdictions probably are
superfluous since the point hns been specifically covered
by the Utah Supreme Court in several cases and only one
other such case "~ill be cited: Cusi.c v. Givens, Idaho 1950,
215 P. 2d 297. The Supreme Court of Idaho succinctly
stated the facts and its ruling at Page 298 where it is
stated:
··The record shows that the road was laid out
and established by ~Ir. Duffy, for his own use,
prior to the sale to ~Ic~Iullen. Through the years
following it was used by the owners and by all
" . .ho had occasion to go to either of the adjacent
farms, by the ditch rider, the milk trucker, hay
buyers, and the occupants of the farn1s in their
farming operations. This use was entirely permissive. Mr. Duffy made no objection. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that any user
claimed an adverse right. Mr. ]\forgan, a predecessor of plaintiffs in the ownership and occupation of the west eighty, and who farmed that
land in 1939, 1940, and 1941, said he used it because he thought it was a public road. The plaintiff, Cusic himself, testified he thought it was a
county road and that the county owned it. A prescriptive right cannot be acquired by such use."
The general rules as to presumptions are thus stated
in C. J. S. pages 736 and 737 :

"Presumptions arising out of user. The continuous user of an easement under a claim of
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right is presumptive evidence of ownership thereof, as against anyone who does not show a superior
right. While the contrary is true in some jurisdictions, sometimes by reason of statute, the general rule is that proof of an open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted user for the prescriptive period, without evidence to explain how it began, raises a presumption that it was adverse
and under a claim of right, or, as is sometimes
stated, raises a presumption of a grant, and casts
on the owner of the servient tenement the burden
of showing that the user was permissive or by virtue of some license, indulgence, or agreement,
inconsistent with the right claimed. The facts to
admit of such presumption are not, however, presumed, and the presumption itself is merely prima
facie and may be rebutted. The presumption does
not arise where the user is shown to be permissive
in its inception, or where it is not shown to have
continued for the prescriptive period; nor, in the
absence of some decisive act indicating separate
and exclusive use, does it arise where the user is
not inconsistent with the rights of the owner, as,
for instance, where the user is in connection with
that of the owner or the public or is claimed with
respect to unoccupied, uninclosed, and unimproved
lands, the use in such cases being presumed to be
permissive and in subordination to the owner's
title."
Two Utah cases should be considered. Zollinger v.
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 770 and
Dahnken v. Georg·e Romney & Sons Comparvy, 111 Utah
471, 184 P. 2d 211.
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In the Zollinger rase W'hirh nrose in ~ache County,
the clailnant Zollinger sho,ved open and rontinuous use
of a right of 'vay across the defendant's land for the prescriptive period of 20 years. The defendant apparently
relied in the ·supreme Court on the rule in Harkness v.
Woodm-ansee that tl1ere is a presumption that the use
is permissive. The Supreme Court held that the rule.
in the Harkness case did not apply in the Zollinger case
because the road had not been opened by the land owner
Frank nor had it been used by him. The Supreme Court
said at Page 773 of 170 A.L.R.:
··The facts of this case do not bring it within
the above quoted rule from Harkness v. W oodrnansee because the evidence does not support the
proposition that this road was opened by the landowner for his own use. The record shows that the
landowner used the road only infrequently and
then used only a portion of it."
This distinguishes the case at bar from Zollinger v.
Frank since there is no dispute in the testimony here that
when Mrs. Kitchens bought the property to the west in
1920 there was a well established and well used right of
way to the east of the 414 property and the testimony
'vas definite that no bushes were interfered with, the
right of way was not extended in any way and there was
testimony from both sides that the W eidners continued
to use the right of way as much as they wanted to and in
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whatever way they wanted to and that the use of it by the
Kitchens family did not interfere with their use.
In Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Company the
claimant of the right of way prevailed. But in this case
there was no evidence whatever that Dahnken who owned
the piece of ground in dispute ever used the right of way
or indeed that he could use the right of way. It was
simply an effort by the owner of the ground to foreclose
the right of the only people who had ever used the right
of way to continue to use it. The case is not at all similar
to the facts in the case at bar where the right of way was
used by the owner, was opened by the owner and was in
full use and existence at the time the claimant first purchased the property.
(B).

THE

MOTION TO DISMISS THE COUNTER

CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Not only do the presumptions favor appellants and
indicate that the use of the driveway was permissive, but
the evidence of the respondents affirmatively establishes
that Mr. and Mrs. Weidner gave permission to Mrs. Kitchens and her family to use the driveway. When the house
was purchased in 1920, the driveway was in use and yet
the only right of way contained in the deed. to Mrs. Willie
Ann Kitchens was a pedestrian right of way along the
west side of the house, (Exhibit A. p. 24). The window
in the coal shed indicated that the driveway had been used
for making deliveries of coal, (R. 34). There is no record
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of any unpleasantness until l~l-!6, no assertion· of claim
by the I~itchenses and "Then the driveway 'vas used in the
presence of ~Ir. and l\lrs.. 'V eidner no objection \vns
made, (R. 29, 50). :\Ir. \Y"eidner even repaired the gate
to facilitate access to the drive"Tay, (R.. 60), and l\frs.
Packard obtained permission to park her car on the W eidner property, (R. 50). The cases hold that such facts
constitute a permissi\e, and not an adverse use.
In Harkness r. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, referred to
supra, the Supreme Court held that the use was permissive and referred to the presumption of permissive use
"There the facts "\Yere that the plaintiff claimed a right of
way and filed a suit to compel removal of a building erected by the defendant on the defendant's prope:rty which
made .use of the right of way by the plaintiff impossible.
The use had been for Jess than twenty years and no prescriptive right had been acquired: as we understand it
but the court went on to consider whether the use was
adverse or permissive. The evidence was that the defendant used the strip of land. as the means of entering the
rear: of.· his own .building on his property and that he
had gates on the right of way a portion of the time and
that his tenant was accustomed to keeping a team standing on the right of way and on the defendant's properties
and that at such times it was impossible for the plaintiff
to use the right of way. The court held that this evidence
showed insufficient conflict with the defendant's use to
constitute an adverse use under claim of right and applied
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the presumption of permissive use under such circumstances.
In Jensen v. Gerrard, Utah 1935, 39 P. 2d 1070
(supra) the court found that the owner had not lost a
prescriptive easement to the claimant although the claimant had used the right of way uninterruptedly and continuously for more than 20 years. The reason for the
holding against the claimant was that periodically the
owner had asked for payments or the claimant had asked
permission to use the roadway for a specific purpose and
there was no evidence that the claimant had asserted an
adverse use under a claim of right for a period of 20
years.
In Cache Valley Bankilng CompO!Jity v. Cache County
Poultry Growe.rs Assn. 209 P. 2d 251, (supra), the court
found open and continuous use of a right of way for more
than 20 years in such volume that there could be no question that the owners of the land had notice of the use.
The original owner had been the Utah-Idaho Central Railroad Company and the user of the right of way was
originally a commission warehouse dealing in poultry
which shipped its produce over the lines of the owner.
The property of the claimant was purchased adjoining
that of the railroad company at the suggestion of the
railroad compa~y and the right of way was made availhie to the shipper indicating a policy to invite the use of
its facilities, including its right of way. There was no
evidence of any communications either written or oral
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eoncerning the claims of the t\vo o\\yners of the properties
and there "~as no express pern1ission given or denied for
use of the right of way. Under these facts the court found
that the use \Yas permissive as it \vas presumed to be because the use by the c.lai1nant did not interfere with the
use of the property by the railroad company.
The applicable general rule is stated in 17 Am. Jur.,
at page 97S as follows:
--l"Tser under an adverse claim of right is
requisite to the acquisition of an easement by prescription. The rule is well settled that use by express or implied permission or license, no matter
how long continued, cannot ripen into an easement
by prescription, since user as of right, as distinguished from permissive user, is lacking."
Likewise in 28 C. J. S. at page 668 the general rule
is stated as follows :
"Where a landowner opens up a way on his
own land for his own use and conveniel}ce, the
mere use thereof by another, under circumstances
which do not injure the road nor interfere with the
owner's use of it, will not in the absence of circumstances indicating a claim of right be considered
as adverse, and will not ripen into a prescriptive
right, no matter how long continued. Where a
space is left open by the owner for his own convenience the presumption ordinarily is that the
use of such space by another, even for his own
purpose is permissive."
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If the use was originally permissive, the burden was
on the respondents to show when it changed to adverse
use. The record was that the first adverse claim was in
1946 when, according to the testimony of George W.
Kitchens and Minnie Kitchens Packard, a gate erected
by the then owners was taken down. It was at about the
same time that the fence was removed. These acts came
too late to commence an effective prescriptive period.
And in the absence of other evidence or adverse claim, it
must be assumed that the permissiye use was never
ehanged.
It might be argued that the use became adverse at
the time the will was written, (Exhibit 4), or the deed was
given, (Exhibit A page 30) but the respondents didn't
know that the will had been given until Mrs. Kitchens died
( R. 32, 106), and at the time of the so-called deed in 1936
Mrs. Weidner did not own the property and could not
effectively convey it. These two documents are evidence
of the permissive nature of the use and of abortive attempts to make that use permanent. If it be assumed
that a claim as of right was made as soon as the earliest
of these documents was prepared, such claim would date
from 1934 and the necessary prescriptive period has not
run. It was knowledge of these documents which lead
appellants to ask at the beginning of the trial whether
respondents claimed by prescription or by de·ed, (R. 9-10).
If the claim were by deed, the only question would be
the validity of the deed since the necessary twenty years
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had not run since the deed was given. That question
'vas not determined as respondents claim by prescription.
In Sara.ge r. Nielson. 11! Utah 22, 197 P. 2d 117, the
claimant of the right of 'Yay "Tas successful in the district
court in quieting an easement over the plaintiff's land and
on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and
remanded the case to.the district court with instructions.
In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court said :
"Of course, it is possible for a use which starts
out permissive to become adverse, after which the
prescriptive period will run. Bowers v. Gilbert,
63 Utah 2±5, 22± P. 881; Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah
200, 125 P. 403, 44 L.R.A. NS 89; Jensen v. Gerrard, Supra, 19 C.J.S. Corp. S.ec. 1210, p. 889, Note
89.
'~The point is, that where the use begins as
permissive it is incumbent upon the party asserting that it has afterward become adverse to show
at what point this occurred, in order to show a 20
yea! hostile period. This is in conformity with the
general rule as previously announced. We are not
justified in conjecturing as to when or if such a
hostile period began. This does :riot conflict with
Zollinger v. Frank, Utah, 175 P. 2d 714, 170 A.L.R.
770."
The court held that the trial courthad erred in quieting an easement and directed the trial court to proceed
with determination of whether a way of necessity existed.
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The Supreme Court recognizes this rule in Jensen v.
Gerrard, (supra), where it first discusses the fact that
a use must be antagonistic and not permissive in order
to support a prescriptive right and then goes on to say at
page 1073 of 39 Pac. 2d:
"The use may spring by permission, and a
prescriptive right thereafter acquired if the right
has been used and exercised for the requisite
period under a claim of right. If a use of the way
is under a parol consent given by the owner of the
servient tenement to use it as if legally conveyed,
it is a use as of right."
For the last proposition the court cited Holm v.
Davis, 41 Utah 200.
This rule is stated in 17 Am. Jur., pages 981 to 982
as fo1lows:
"If the use originates by permission or license
and an easement by prescription is claimed, the
burden of proving that the permissive use had
ceased and that the use for the necessary period
had been adverse under claim of right is on the
party asserting the fact of the adverse user, and
in case of doubt, such fact will be resolved against
him."
C.J.S. page 656 as follows:
"The fact that a user is permissive in its inception does not in itself prevent it from subse-
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quently becon1ing adyer8e and ripening into an
easen1ent by prescription. If a liet nsee renounePs
the authority by " . hich he began the use and clabns
it as his o". n right, and that fact is brought to the
kno,vledge of the licensor, after "'"hich the licensee
continues the use under such adverse clai111 exclusively, continuously, and uninterruptedly for the
full prescriptive period, the right will become absolute. Nevertheless, if the use begins as a permissive use it is presumed to continue as such, and in
order to transform it into an adverse one there
must be a distinct and positive assertion of a right
hostile to the rights of the owner, and such assertion must be brought to the attention of the owner,
and the use continued for the full prescriptive
period under the assertion of right, excluding the
time under which the user was permissive * * *"
1

And in any event there was no notice or effort to give
notice to the appellants or their predecessors in interest
that an adverse claim was being made and there must
be such notice before a prescriptive period can commence.

That the assertion of a claim under a void deed even
though there has been a permissive use up to that time
can ripen into a prescriptive easement is established
by the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Gerrard where
at 39 P. 2d 1070 at page 1073 this Court said as above
quoted:
"If a use of the way is under a parol consent
given by the owner of the servient tenement to
use it as if legally conveyed it is a use as of right."
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And it may be conceded that use of the right of way
for 20 years by the Kitchens family following the giving
i of the deed in 1936 could result in a prescriptive easement
provided only that the giving of the deed and the claim
!Jof ownership was know~ t~ the owners of the servient
tenement who are the pla1nt~ffs here.
1

c•
c

<

.....•

N
t.n

1

• I

•

"The rule that a permissive user will not ripen
into an easement by prescription does not apply
where there has been an attempt to grant an easement which is void because of the statute of
frauds. The claim of right which enters into adverse enjoyment need not be a well-founded claim,
and therefore, it has been held that a user under
a contract void under the statute of frauds is a
good claim of right on which to found a prescriptive easement." 17 Am. Jur. 979.

. ·+i

<

N

0'

If the only claim of the respondents of a change from
· a permissive to an adverse use be the tearing down of the
I) fence and the gate in 1946 or later then it is obvious that
no prescriptive rights can have been acquired. Likewise
if the claim is under the 1936 deed no prescriptive rights
have accrued.
·~

Repair of the road way cannot be considered evidence
in favor or against acquisition of a prescriptive right, as
was stated in Zollinger v. F·rank, (supra), and also in 28
C.J.S. page 668 where the following is stated:
"However, in order to acquire this adverse
character knowledge must be brought home to the
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o'vner of the land that the user is elnimed as of
right. The require1nent is not satisfied by keeping
the road in repair for the use of both parties, or
by constructing and n1aintaining bridges on it.~,
It,

therefore~

appears that the eyidence of respond-

ents failed in an essential of proof, namely, in showing
that the use of the driYe\Yay \Yas adverse.
(C).

IF APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE BE BELIEVED,

THERE WAS NO ACQUIESCENCE BY PREDECESSORS OF
APPELLANTS.

In general the testimony of appellants confirms that
of respondents since the relationship between the two
families was friendly and no objection was ever made to
use of the right of way. Both Mrs. F'red E. Weidner and
Bessie Evelyn Ferguson testified affirmatively to rendering help to delivery men in using the driveway for the
benefit of the Kitchens family, (R. 95 and 98). The chief
differences were that appellants' witnesses testified that
several previous gates were put across the driveway, (R.
86, 95, and 99), that there was an agreement permitting
Mrs. Kitchens to use the driveway, (R. 86 and 89), and the
witness Evans testified that he had an argument with
George W. Kitchens in which he compelled Mr. Kitchens
to back down from his claim of right, (R. 77). This evidence if it be believed, conclusively establishes that no
claim of right was successfully asserted by respondents
and that the judgment will fall because of that defect.
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This evidence should be believed as it must be born
in mind that Fred E. Weidner and Bessie Evelyn Fer~
guson sold their interest in the property in 1946 and had
no interest in protecting the property against right of
way. And the witness Evans was completely disinterested in the outcome of this suit.
2.

THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING A RIGHT OF WAY

AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS FOR USE WHICH WOULD
BENEFIT OTHER LANDS THAN THE PROPERTY KNOWN
AS 414 EAST FOURTH SOUTH.

It will be noticed that the decree does not limit use
of this right of way, but permits respondents "in any and
all other reasonable manner and for ingress and egress
from the premises of the defendants" and then describes
the right of way over a 10 foot wide strip 99 feet in depth,
(R. 112, paragraph 2). This right of way is made appurtenant to the property described in paragraph 3 of the
decree which is the property at 414 East F'ourth S.outh,
(R. 112), and then the plaintiffs are enjoined from interfering with the right of way, (R. 112 paragraph 5). Mr.
G. W. Kitchens testified that he has purchased the interests of the other respondents, (R. 45), that he owns property adjoining 414 East F·ourth South to the west and
then to the south, (R. 40), and that he intends to ·operate
all of the property as a motel, (R. 40), intending to drive
cars used for other portions of the motel down the driveway and park them in the rear of 414 East Fourth South,
(R. 40).
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This failure of the court to restriet the right of \vay
"~as objected to by appellants, (R,. 113 to 114 paragraph
±).
The general rule is that a prescriptive right shall be
limited to the minimum use 'Yhich existed for the prescriptive period and for the benefit of lands which have
been benefited during the prescriptive period. Nielson v.
Sandberg, 105 l 1 tah 93, 1-±1 Pac. 2d 696; 17 Am. Jur., on
Easen1ents, Section 100: 95 Am. St. Rep. 325.
3.

THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING RESPOND-

ENTS TO DRIVE ACROSS THE RIGHT-OF-WAY ONTO
THEIR LAND WHERE A FENCE HAD EXISTED UNTIL AT
LEAST 1946.

A more difficult question is whether it would be departure from the alleged prescriptive use for the Kitchens family
at this late date to start driving vehicles
,.
down the right of way and across the point where a fence
used to exist onto the back of their property. The same
question stated differently is whether the W eidners are
now to be deprived of the privilege of fencing the west
side of the right of way and placing a gate across the
right of way so as to give a private enclosure in their
back yard which was enjoyed by them more or less continuously until 1932 and periodically since that time.·
In Nielson v. Sandberg, (supra), this court held:

"An easement, being a burden upon the land
which it traverses is limited to uses for which, or
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by which it was acquired, and to the person who
acquired it, or for the benefit of the property for
which it was acquired."
This rule found further expression in Big Cottonwood Canyon Ditch Company v. Moyle, 109 Utah 197,
159 P. 2d 596, where the question before the court was
whether an easement to convey water across the servient
owner's land which had theretofore resulted in seepage
with beneficial advantage to the servient owners through
stimulated growth of trees and shrubs, was such that the
dominant owner could place a culvert and stop the seepage thereby depriving the servient owners of the benefit
they had theretofore enjoyed. The court thus propounded
the only question decided in this case:
"Will the proposed changes by the owner of
the easement right create a greater burden on the
·servient tenements~"
The court thus answered its own question:
"The extent of the easement is determined by
the grant, or if based upon a prescriptive right, by
its use, and once the character of the easement has
been fixed no material change or enlargement of
the right acquired can be made if thereby a greater
burden is placed on the servient estate."
And the court held that the change.of use in that case
would place a greater burden on the servient estate. On
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rehearing this rule \Yas left intaet but its application in
the rase of seepage \Yater \Yas denied for the reason that
Utah's 'vater la'v is different from the conunon la'v \vhich
still, however, controls the la'Y of easements.
In ..~..\.m. Jur. on Easen1ents, at pages 973 to 974 it is
stated:
.. :Jioreover, to entitle a person to an ease1nent
by prescription, he must show that he has always
used the right claimed without change or variation. The right derived from use does not exceed
the user in which it has its origin. * * * A claimant who, within the prescriptive period, enlarges
the use cannot, at the end of that time, claim the
use as so enlarged."
The law is settled that a substantial change in the use
cannot be made during the prescriptive period and that
the changes which do not injuriously affect the rights of
the owner of the servient tenement will not be held to
break the continuity of the prescriptive period. It is then
said:
"While a party who has increased his use of
an easement during the prescriptive period cannot
claim the enlarged use, a more extensive and burdensome use for a portion of the prescriptive period will not impair the effect of such user as has
been continuous for the full prescriptive period,
provided the two uses are separable, but not otherwise, since such a mingling of uses is wholly the
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part of the party claiming the easement. If a more
burdensome user than that originally exercised is
continued for the prescriptive period, an easement
for such use may be acquired."
In Riggs v. Springfield, (Missouri, 1939) 126 SW 2d
1144, 122 A.L.R. 1496 at page 1503, the law was thus
stated:
"Necessarily, therefore, when a way is claimed
by prescription, the character and extent of it is
fixed and determined by the use under which it is
gained. Any material change in its use during the
course of the prescriptive period interrupts and
may prevent the acquisition of the right. Washburn on Easements and Servitudes, page 136, Et.
seq. Under prescription an exclusive right of possession cannot be established but only a qualified
right for a particular purpose. Jones on Easements, Sec. 161."
A greater burden would· be placed on this right of
way if the Kitchenses were allowed to drive cars down
the right of way and across onto their land in several
different particulars:
First: So long as the Kitchenses have been using
the right of way, according to the testimony, they have
used it so as not to interfere with the use thereof by the
W eidners which means that the use would not be frequent,
that the vehicles would move slowly, and that there could
not be a number of vehicles in the possession or use of
the right of way at the same time.
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Second: Since George I~itchens plans to operate a
motel on the entire corner it "Tould be iinpossible to determine whether the o\vner of -!1-! is using the right of way
for himself as pern1itted or \vhether one of the tenants
or guests of the Inotel is using the right of way contrary
to right unless the cars are detained on the right of way.
This would involve an additional burden which could be
avoided by placing the fence where it was.
Third: Hithero the ,,. .eidners enjoyed the privilege
of an enclosed and fenced backyard \vhich is convenient
for children as well as for privacy and might support
additional uses not hitherto enjoyed. For the Kitchenses
now to assert the right to remove the fence and prevent
erection of a new fence deprives the appellants of a very
substantial benefit.
4.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION

FOR NEW TRIAL.

Whether the facts and the law will support the decree
of the trial court is amply raised on the record without a
new trial. The only new question raised by the motion
for new trial is, therefore, whether the affidavit of Eloise
Bowden, (R. 117 to 118), presented material evidence
which might alter the result. The motion was considered
and the affidavit was, therefo-re, accepted as newly discovered evidence and it must be assumed that on a new
trial the evidence would be produced as stated in the affidavit.
The decree of the court can be upheld only upon the
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theory that the Kitchenses used the driveway under
claim of right and adversely to the W eidners. This result would be completely destroyed if it were shown that
the right was permissive as to the W eidners or that the
use was not under claim of right but by agreement with
or license from the W eidners. The affidavit establishes
an agreement or license between the Weidners and the
Kitchenses for use of the driveway in exchange for use
of the telephone, and after a telephone was installed
shows an acknowledgement of ownership in the Weidners
with a license to use the right of way for which license
1\tfrs. Kitchens paid $1.00 on two different occasions and
made gifts of bread and puddings on other occasions.
Furthermore, the affidavit establishes the erection of a
gate in 1933 which remained there for at least six months
and which interrupted the use of the driveway and recommenced the prescriptive period as of 1933, which leaves
insufficient time for running of the period to the date
of commencement of the action.
It is true that similar matters were testified to by
Mr. and Mrs. Weidner, by Mr. Evans, and by Mrs. Ferguson. The court obviously did not accept the testhnony of
these witnesses, and that can be only on the theory that
the witnesses were not believed. It does not follow that
Mrs. Eloise Bowden would likewise be disbelieved, and
since her testimony, if credible, would destroy the case
made by respondents, the motion f<;>r new trial should
have been granted, at least to the extent of receiving the
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testimony of ~Irs. Bowden for the effect it might have
in the final result.
SlT:~I~IARY

AND CONCLUSION

The evidence offered by respondents in this case fell
far short of establishing a prescriptive right and was
based upon the erroneous theory that by showing use for
20 years "~ithout objection from the Weidners a right of
\vay would be established. This could be the only theory
upon which the trial court based its decree, unless the
court found that some how the writing of a supposed will
and the giving of an abortive deed gave support to the
claim of right of way which had been permissive up to
that time. We do not find cases or other authorities which
support a right of way by prescription under these circumstances.
Appellants recognize the sentimental force back of
the suggestion that since the aged Mrs. Weidner attempted to give a quit claim deed to her friend the aged Mrs.
l{itchen, the court should recognize that intent; but that
ignores the position of the owners. of the land. ~fr. Fred
E. Weidner and Mrs. Ferguson acquired the land from
their mother in 1934, and it was for them to say whether
a deed to the right of way should have been given gratis
to Mrs. Kitchens in 1936.
More accurate under the facts is the argument that
here were the Weidners who wanted to be neighborly and
in a friendly fashion and as a personal accommodation
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permitted the Kitchenses to use the right of way. This
use continued from 1920 to 1946 when a gate was erected
for the convenience of tenants, in a manner similar to
the erection of other gates in earlier years and with no
intention of preventing the use of the driveway. At this
point, however, the accommodated users had decided to
make a claim and they not only torn down the gate but
removed the fence which had always separated their
property from the driveway and proceeded to use the
driveway as though it were their own property. If this
claim were based upon the deed, it is invalid and the clain1
must be denied. If the claim is based upon prescription,
it is an effort to take advantage of neighborly accommodation and occurs at the end instead of at the beginning of a
26 year period of permissive use. No such claim was asserted before that.
The motion to dismiss should have been granted upon the evidence produced by respondents. The applicable
presumptions make this a permissive use of a right of
way upon which no rights can be founded. The evidence
of appellants, if this court believe it, showed a limited
permission to use, based upon the erection of succe~ssive
gates to enclose the backyard of the Weidners and an
agreement covering use of the driveway. If confirmation
of appellants' witnesses were needed, it is to be found
in the affidavit of Eloise Bowden filed in support of the
motion for new trial.
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And beyond all these arguments, any right of way
granted would have to be limited to use consistent with
erection of a fence between the driveway and the property of respondent and limited to use for the benefit of
the Kitchens property when used as a residence and not
as a motel.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS .AND BIRD,
AND· DAN ~s. BUSHNELL,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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